Der folgende Artikel soll zur Vorbereitung unseres dogmatischen Faschismusseminars dienen.
Die aktuelle Faschismus-Diskussion schlug sich in Deutschland in einer wissenschaftlichen Publikation nieder (EWE 15), die im Herbst 2004 erschien. Zu dieser Diskussion leitete Roger Griffin mit dem Hauptartikel des Heftes ein.
Der folgende Artikel entstand als Antwort auf Griffin durch Roger Eatwell und spiegelt dessen Forschungsansatz wieder. Ebenso aber verdeutlicht dieser Text einige theoretische Positionen Roger Griffins.
A response to Professor Roger Griffin's 'Fascism's New Faces (and New Facelessness) in the post-fascist Epoch' for the journal:
Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik (2004)
Professor of European Politics, University of Bath
(1) In his 1991 magnum opus (backed up by a selection of texts on fascism published four years' later), Roger Griffin set out two main arguments:
That a broad set of generic 'fascist' movements (and to a much lesser extent regimes) emerged after 1918, which included Italian Fascism and German National Socialism as their prime examples.
That the 'fascist minimum' should be defined essentially by its self-proclaimed ideology, 'whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism'  (a very different line to the ubiquitous Marxisant one which identifies 'fascism' with its alleged structural function of protecting the interests of a bourgeoisie in crisis).
Subsequently, Griffin expanded on two positions implicit in his earlier work, and set out a further broad assertion:
That fascism was a major form of anti-religious 'political religion', which helps explain not just its liturgy and style, but also its fanaticism and destructiveness.
That fascism, far from dying in the ruins of 1945, lived on as an important force especially in various 'groupuscules' which are now growing in importance.
That a 'new consensus' had emerged in fascist studies around these first two points - and recently Griffin seems to be increasingly holding that #3 is also becoming part of this 'new consensus'.
(2) During the last decade, Griffin has become a renowned scholar in the Anglophone world. His work has unquestionably had an impact on the growing band of scholars of 'generic fascism'. The emphasis on ideas is part of a much wider trend within historiography and the social sciences.  But the return to Ernst Nolte's stress on the need to set out a brief 'fascist minimum',  based on an empathetic study of ideology (a method broadly shared by two other key historians who have clearly influenced
Griffin, George Mosse and Emilio Gentile),  was an important corrective to two widespread academic tendencies. First, to those who set out discursive accounts of an ill-defined 'fascism', and secondly to those who see fascism as unintellectual, even a form of nihilism.
(3) However, as David Baker will argue in a forthcoming book, that there are at least two other competing non-Marxist �consensi�.  First, there are variations on the developmental dictatorship school, which see 'fascist' regimes as a product of specific crises during stages of economic modernisation. Secondly, there is the liberal historiographical approach, which sees 'fascism' as remarkably mercurial and which rejects the overdetermining elements in any conceptual framework. Within the latter camp, most historians simply ignore the 'generic fascism' debate, or dismiss it as being of little or no use by way of historical explanation with regards to specific cases. This is particularly true of historians of the allegedly sui generis nature of Nazism (especially German historians of the Third Reich). Even Sir Ian Kershaw, who is willing to concede that there were major ideological affinities between Nazism and Fascism, finds no place for discussion of the generic fascism concept in his definitive biography of Hitler 
(4) Contrary to the last group, I share Griffin's - and earlier major historians, like Stanley Payne's  - view that we can identify a broad 'generic fascism' without resorting to its alleged structural functions, and that the concept can be analytically useful. However, in varying degrees I differ with Griffin on points #2-#5 above. In the limited space, which follows, I will offer some brief reflections especially on Griffin's Weberian ideal-type methodology (13), and the quasi-religious, identity-linked themes he sees as essential to the 'fascist minimum' (27 and 30).
(5) There are serious dangers in over-stressing fascism's affective rather than its more rational economic and other appeals. Even 'charismatic' leaders do not have to be understood in terms of Weberian mass charisma: their appeal has also to be understood in terms of 'coterie charisma', the magnetisation of an inner core, while rational choice explanations stress factors such as the 'low cost signaling' power of leaders who come to personify politics.  Moreover, productivist third way economic programmes featured prominently in fascist ideology, a point which has been underlined by two other pioneers of the empathetic ideological approach - A.J. Gregor and Zeev Sternhell (though neither see Nazism as fascist on account of its biological and rabid racism, a view which glosses over the varieties of racism among the Nazis and the forms of racism within Italian Fascism).  As a result, I have argued that a more comprehensive one-sentence definition, which can serve as a simple way of identifying fascism is:
An ideology that strives to forge social rebirth based on a holistic-national radical Third Way, though in practice fascism has tended to stress style, especially action and the charismatic leader, more than detailed programme, and to engage in a Manichean demonisation of its enemies. 
(6) However, it is important to stress that Weberian ideal type fascist 'minima' raise major methodological problems. One concerns the fact that in practice fascism was highly opportunistic, varying both between countries and through time even in the inter-war era: how do we discern the 'true' fascism, which lay behind this protean flux? An even more fundamental difficulty stems from the fact that key themes could be understood in different ways even in the same country at the same time. Thus 'rebirth', which is a philosophically banal concept, was encompassed both by conservatives who sought restoration, and by radicals who sought a new order. Similarly, nationalism could be conceived by ideologists both in terms of the (re)creation of identity, and in terms of the economic interest of specific programmes.
(7) The �fascist minimum�, therefore, needs to be supplemented by what I term the 'fascist matrix'.  The point of the matrix is to highlight that instead of simply prioritising key words, we need to ask how fascists conceived such terms, including what they were defined against. At the heart of fascist thinking was the creation of a new elite of men, who would forge a holistic nation and build a new third way state. However, there were notable differences among even fascist intellectuals about how to interpret these themes, not least because central to fascism's way of thinking was the synthesis of ideas.  Among the most important of these were: a conservative view of man contained by nature and a more left-wing view of the possibilities of creating a 'new man'; between a commitment to science, especially in terms of understanding human nature, and a more anti-rationalist, vitalist interest in the possibilities of the will; between the faith and service of Christianity and the heroism of Classical thought (contrary to the common view, including Griffin's, many fascists, including Nazis, saw themselves as Christians);  and between private property relations more typical of the right and a form of welfarism more typical of the left.
(8) The matrix becomes even more important as we turn to the contemporary era, because modern fascism can involve notable mutations. Griffin's emphasis on its 'groupuscular' contemporary form is an important one in the sense that small, ideologically-driven groups can sew wider mayhem, for example by influencing violent recidivist youths through white power music (37). But arguably the most dangerous forms of contemporary fascism are those who have adopted more conservative forms of synthesis and which no longer preach forms of radical rebirth for the masses (though they still focus on the need for a new elite). These operate both within and around more important groupings, such as the French National Front and the British National Party, which has recently 'modernised' its image and sought to break with an overt fascist past in favour of a more subtle blend of radicalism and populism (a trend which has been accompanied by a notable improvement in its electoral fortunes).
(9) T he counter-epistemological claim underpinning my approach is that it is necessary to make clear the interpretation(s) about individual behaviour linked to the definition offered. Put another way, it helps to think in terms of �concept� and �theory�. I take the term concept to mean a basic definition, or semantic classification: this involves both a basic fascist minimum and a more discursive fascist matrix. I understand the term theory to refer to the development of specific propositions about why a political phenomenon occurs and which are capable of some form of empirical testing. The best concept is the one, which offers the most theoretical insights - otherwise the concept is largely an abstraction.
(10) Whilst some form of perceived crisis is an important precondition for the rise of the fascism, it is a mistake to see fascism essentially in terms of a one dimensional (wo)man seeking a response to what Griffin terms a 'sense-making crisis' (30). Several major recent empirical studies of inter-war fascist voting have stressed economic dimensions, whereas the evidence for fascism's affective appeal tends to be more anecdotal. The former includes computer based modeling, whereas the latter, for example in Griffin's case, can involve using literary quotes as evidence.  This is not to reject the insights, which can come from more qualitative methods. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that work on voting for contemporary 'right extremist'/'fascist' groups stresses a mix of motives. Fascism is essentially a syncretic movement, capable of attracting people for very different reasons. Interpretations, which stress identity, and especially political religion, significantly downplay the importance of other factors, especially rational economic ones. Moreover, a full theory of fascism needs to take on board what I term a three dimensional approach, namely a focus on the micro (individual behaviour), macro (broader structural etc. factors) and meso (the local and group phenomenon) dimensions.  Political religion approaches, borrowing from mass society theory, imply that fascism will succeed where individuals are most isolated. But fascism often succeeded by influencing key opinion makers and/or by penetrating existing groups, often where civil society was most dense. Seeking to reduce fascism to a quest for nationalist rebirth offers some important insights, but it is an unduly essentialist vision.
Chiaruscuro or Fascismo Grigio?
A Response to Roger Griffin�s Reply to His Critics
(Da Capo, con meno brio�)
Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik (2004)
((1)) Roger Griffin has written an elegant and powerful defence of his EWE article on generic fascism (if anything, perhaps conceding too much to some critics). As in the original Hauptartikel, Griffin paints with a very broad brush and he undoubtedly operates on an impressively large canvas at a time when many academics prefer to master the detail of miniatures. However, Griffin�s synoptic sweep tends at times to induce an almost alcohol-induced blurred vision, precisely because the argument is so general.
((2)) As one of Griffin�s more sympathetic first round critics, I must reiterate at the outset of this short reply that I am in agreement with the broad thrust of his argument - namely that it is fruitful to identify a form of generic fascist ideology, transcending the inter-war era, and which includes Nazism as its most notorious manifestation. However, whilst Griffin recognises the force of my previous central argument � namely that the best concept (definition) should offer the most fertile theoretical (explanatory) insights (R 1 (16) (33)) � he offers nothing by way of serious elaboration.
((3)) For my second reply, therefore, I have chosen to focus on this point by considering some wider implications of Griffin�s forceful reiteration of his belief that at the core of any Weberian ideal-type conception of generic fascism must be the myth of the reborn nation - or as he tends to term it, �palingenetic ultra-nationalism� (R 1(22)).
((4)) Several of the sharpest Hauptartikel critics have already pointed to various problems with this minimum formulation, especially the fact that rebirth and radical nationalism have been significant features of many important movements and regimes during the twentieth century which were not truly fascist (see especially the contributions of David Baker and Stanley Payne). I would add that at the level of the history of ideas it misses the pan-Europeanism which was a feature of both some forms of Nazi racism and of non-biological racist Italian Fascist thought, and which since 1945 has been especially strong in strands of neo-fascism. 
((5)) Rather than expand on these points, I want to pick up two aspects of Griffin�s conceptual-theoretical approach which were largely ignored by other critics - namely that fascism has been a form of �political religion� and that its most prominent leaders exerted a powerful �charismatic� appeal (R 1 (9) (10) (12) (26)). Neither form a necessary part of Griffin�s brief fascist minimum, but both are clearly linked to the centrality which rebirth plays in his approach.
((6)) In his 1991 magnum opus, Griffin was critical of the �political religion� approach  (an interpretation of fascism which has been around since the 1930s,  and which since the 1980s has been developed most fertilely by Emilio Gentile  ). However, Griffin seems to have been converted to the approach during the 1990s in an attempt to respond to critics who argued that his initial formulation of the fascist minimum had little explanatory purchase.  Griffin�s use of a Weberian conception of charisma, a term which derives initially from religion,  serves a similar purpose. Namely, it points to the allegedly great affective powers of leaders like Hitler and Mussolini, who at moments of crisis achieve almost god-like status.
((7)) There is no doubt that fascism, especially in its Nazi and Italian regime forms, adopted a quasi-religious style, which venerated leadership. From its earliest days, Italian Fascism turned its dead into martyrs, while the Duce quickly spawned an extensive hagiography. Hitler's language was replete with words like 'mission' ( Sendung ), 'salvation' (Rettung), and �redemption� (Erlösung). Some fascists sought to replace existing religions, and were conscious of the need for fascism to adopt both the epistemological and emotive functions of religion. However others � arguably the majority of fascist leaders - thought that fascism was perfectly consistent with (usually a reformed) Christianity, which could be synthesised with fascism.  For example, leading Nazis specifically sought to fit Hitler into the Protestant tradition through the doctrine of Providence, which held that God directed the affairs of men in moments of great need. 
((8)) The aesthetisation of politics is not necessarily the same as its sacralisation. Indeed, the military style of inter-war fascism, including a strong iconography of male virility, was arguably more pervasive than its religious rites and symbolism. Moreover, style is not the same as ideology. It is particularly vital to stress that style does not necessarily tell us anything about fundamental belief - either of leaders or followers (other than the belief among the party elites in the importance of leadership, and more generally of propaganda).
((9)) Hitler was undoubtedly seen by many leading Nazis as having almost god-like powers in terms of divining what course to follow. There is ample testimony in documents such as the Goebbels diaries to this, for example after the crucial Bamberg conference, before which it had seemed that the NSDAP might break up. The fact that most Nazi leaders remained remarkably loyal until near the very end also serves as good evidence of Hitler�s power over the inner court (although the Allied policy of total surrender did not encourage palace coups). In the early years of Italian Fascism, Mussolini was in many ways seen by the ras as primus inter pares, but there seems little doubt that he late came to be viewed as possessing a special mission by many close colleagues (although this did not prevent his overthrow in the Fascist Grand Council in 1943, as the war increasingly turned for the worse). However, this �coterie charisma� , this magnetic influence over an inner core, does not prove that such leaders exerted a similar appeal over the masses, or that fascism more generally was a form of surrogate religion which emerged in response to an existential, or in Griffin�s term a �sense making�, crisis. 
(10)) I will illustrate this point by taking two specific examples of fascist support � the initial take-off of Nazism and the heyday of Italian Fascism. It is often forgotten that after almost a decade of stagnation, the Nazis began to make notable electoral gains before the onset of the Wall Street Crash, and the ensuing economic and political crisis, which befell Germany. Italian fascism also appears to have been most popular in the early to mid-1930s, a time of relative economic stability in Italy, and a time when even some foreign observers thought that a new economic order might be emerging in the country.
((11)) Although there are still major disputes among historians about the causes of the rise of Nazism, five short run factors were crucial during 1928-9. First, was the rural economic crisis. Second was a new set of Nazi policies specifically aimed at these and other grievances. Third, was the reorganisation of the Nazi Party, including the tactic of swamping target areas with activists during elections. Fourth, the frequency of elections in Weimar Germany allowed the Nazis to use success in one locality to create a sense of rapid progress, and create a ratchet effect. Finally, the nationalist battle against reparations led in 1929 to Hitler gaining access to the vast Hugenberg media empire, and with it mainstream legitimation as well as voice. The first four factors have little or nothing to do with charisma or political religions. Even Hitler�s access to the mass media does not necessarily prove that he attracted primarily affective support. Although the evidence is inconclusive, it could be hypothesised that the effect was more to make voters aware of Nazi policies, which could help them.
((12)) The extent to which there was �consensus� support for the Italian Fascist regime in the mid-1930s is a matter of considerable dispute. Some historians argue that the lack of overt opposition was more a feature of repression than positive endorsement, but probably a relatively large swathe of Italian people at this time in some way accepted or endorsed Fascism (though the growing links with Hitler after 1936 met with little enthusiasm). However, the key factors, which help to explain this support have little to do with political religion or charisma. One issue was Mussolini�s 1929 agreement with the Catholic Church, which appeased devout conservatives who sought a normalisation of church-state relations. Among the working class, the holiday and welfare benefits brought by the Dopolavoro organisation were popular. Growing consumerism, including rapidly rising attendances at cinemas where modernist �white telephone� films were especially popular, also helped the regime. Nor was nationalism simply martial. Colonial expansion was often portrayed in Luce newsreels and other propaganda in terms of its economic advantages for a country, which in many ways was still economically backward (though this is to deny that Mussolini pursued a brutal policy of overseas expansion).  Nationalism also took many innocent forms - such as support for Italy�s triumphant football team, and its grand prix racing cars, which vied for honours with German ones.
((13)) It has become commonplace to place to portray fascism as highly influenced by Sorelian conceptions of mythology. It is usually forgotten that Sorel not only criticised turn of the twentieth century socialists for their emphasis on rational appeals, but also for their (re)distributionism. Sorel believed that a socialist regime, which could not deliver high living standards would not be able to legitimise itself in a world in which the American dream was exerting a growing influence. Interpretations of fascism, which focus on it being a political religion miss the fact that it had a strong Third Way economic aspect to its programmes � an appeal which, whilst not necessarily deriving from, certainly mirrored Sorel�s emphasis on productivism and widespread welfare.
((14)) Indeed, a crucial aspect of fascism was its various syntheses, including aspects of both irrationalist and rationalist thought. This syncretism makes it particularly difficult to fit fascism into any brief �minimum� or Weberian �ideal type�. For this reason, I have argued that it is better to think of fascist thought within a matrix made up of three main themes: �new man�; �nation�; and �state�.  Within each, it was possible to come to notably different syntheses. Thus new man could refer to just elite revitalisation, or to reprogramming the mind of the masses; the nation could be based on either biological race or culture (and Europe could be re-imagined as a nation); the strong state could be justified as a means to initiate radical redistribution towards the poor or to defend a more conservative vision income and wealth differentials; and so on. These differences within fascism at any one point are far more significant than the vaguely defined stages which of fascism passed through according to Robert Paxton (a model based on only two movement-regime examples!). 
((15)) People came to support fascism for many factors, including group conformity within local (meso) contexts � a fact often forgotten by theories which focus on sweeping (macro) or individual (micro) approaches.  The way in which fascist support could vary within highly similar localities, for instance in Schleswig Holstein, demonstrates the importance of opinion leaders such as pastors and doctors and the way in which civil society (contrary to much contemporary democratisation theory) could act as both a facilitator and prophylactic.
((16)) Although there were undoubtedly some who were attracted to fascism as some form of religion, this appears to have been a minority compared to those attracted to fascism for specific policy reasons and through group conformity. There were undoubtedly more people who perceived Hitler, and to a lesser extent Mussolini, in terms of redemptive powers, but it is important not to stress the affective charismatic appeal of leaders outside an inner coterie (where their powers could undoubtedly help to keep divided parties together).
((17)). It is also instructive to consider the issue of political religion and charisma in connection with the most radical Nazi policy, namely the Holocaust. Anti-semitism was undoubtedly deeply rooted in German religious traditions, and some Nazis sought a Holy War against the Jews (and communists). But Hannah Arendt�s depiction of the �banality of evil� reveals more insights into how mass killings worked in practice. In Hitler�s inner circle, courtiers view to �work towards the Führer�.  But the Nazi state in many ways remained, in Weberian terms, a legal rational rather than a charismatic one: people obeyed what they took as duly constituted orders.  To the extent that killing had a legitimation beyond a legal rational one, it owed at least as much to eugenic science as to religion (a good example of where Nazism owed much to rationalism).
((18)) Nevertheless, it is important not completely to downplay the importance of leadership at the mass appeal level. The fact that the Nazis were often known as the �Hitler party�, and the tendency of the party during 1928-1933 to appeal to many who were least interested in politics, provides an important theoretical steer. Rational choice theorists talk of strong leaders offering �low cost signalling� - namely helping the more apolitical to understand policies, to formulate a view about why they should vote. Contrary to Weber, in many cases these motives were perfectly rational, and were often based on economic self-interest. Put another way, leaders such as Hitler are not so much examples of Weberian mass affective charisma as of �centripetal charisma� � the ability to bring into the fold a remarkably diverse (and unstable) set of supporters.
((19)) The problem with Roger Griffin�s basic conception is, therefore, a double one. On the one had it can be seen to encompass a broad variety of movements and regimes which neither saw themselves as inspired by fascism, nor which are included within the fascist Pantheon even by most sympathisers with the generic fascism approach. On the other hand, it points to an overly narrow theorisation of the main manifestations of fascism, in which support is understood largely as a uniform shade of grey.
((20)) There are clear dangers in seeking to counter Griffin�s emphasis on the mythical-religious side of fascism by equally over-stating its rational economic side. But is it important to remember that by 1933 the Nazis were not simply a mass movement with almost twice the electoral support of the next largest party (the SPD). They were also a Volkspartei - or to use the terminology of political science, a �catch-all� party.
 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (1991), p.26 (italics in the original). See also Griffin (ed.) Fascism (1995)
 On the latter, R.C. Lieberman, 'Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change', American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 4, 2002, p.697 notes: 'Long dormant in the systematic study of politics, ideas have staged a remarkable comeback in the social sciences in the last 15 years or so.'
 See especially Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (first German ed. 1963).
 For example, Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology (1964) and Gentile, and Gentile, Le Origini dell'Ideologia Fascista (1975), who specifically uses the term 'palingenetic' in relation to fascism and was later to become a leading advocate of the fascism as a political religion interpretation.
 Baker, T heories and Models of Fascism. A Multi-dimensional Approach (forthcoming).
 Kershaw, Hitler (2 vols.: 1998 and 1999).
 See especially S. Payne, Fascism: Comparison and Definition (1980).
 See R. Eatwell, 'The Rebirth of Right-Wing Charisma?: the Cases of jean-Marie Le Pen and Vladimir Zhirinovsky', Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions , Vol. 3, No. 3, 2002.
 See especially Gregor, Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship (1979); and Sternhell, Ni Droite, Ni Gauche (1983). The importance of economic policy, especially corporatism, has also been argued forcefully by David Roberts, �How Not to Think about Fascism and Ideology, Intellectual Antecedents and Historical meaning', Journal of Contemporary History , Vol. 35, No. 2, 2000.
 Roger Eatwell, �On Defining the �Fascist Minimum�: the Centrality of Ideology�, Journal of Political Ideologies , Vol. 1, No. 3, 1996, p.313 (italics in the original).
 See especially Eatwell, Fascism: a History (new Introduction in 2003 reprint), and Eatwell, 'Zur Natur das "generischen Faschismus" - das "faschistische Minimum" und die "fastische Matrix", in U. Backes (ed), Rechsextreme Ideologien im 20 und 21 Jahhundert (2003).
 R. Eatwell, 'Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism', Journal of Theoretical Politics , Vol. 4, No. 2, 1992.
 See especially R. Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich. Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945 (2003).
 For instance, compare W. Brustein, Logic of Evil. The Social Origins of the Nazi Party, 1925-1933 (1996) and E. Spencer Wellhofer, 'Democracy and Fascism: Class, Civil Society and Rational Choice in Italy', American Political Science Review , Vol. 97, No. 1, 2003 with R. Griffin, 'The Palingenetic Political Community: Rethinking the Legitimation of Totalitarian Regimes in Inter-War Europe', Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions , Vo. 3, No. 3, 2002, e.g. p.34.
 For example, 'Towards a New Model of the Rise of Right-Wing Extremism', German Politics , Vol. 6, No. 3, 1997.
 The French intellectual, Maurice Bardèche, who was mainly influenced by Italian Fascism, set up a post-war journal tellingly entitled Défense de l�Occident . See also the German neo-fascist journal Nation Europa , where the main form of inspiration was more Waffen-SS �Europeanism�.
 R. Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London: Pinter, 1991), especially p.196.
 See especially, E. Voegelin, Political Religions (Lewiston, N.Y.: E. Mellen Press, 1986; 1 st German ed. 1938).
 See especially E. Gentile, The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1996).
 For an example of a recent work which seeks to use �political religion� as a way of explaining support see R. Griffin,�The Palingenetic Political Community: Rethinking the Legitimation of Totalitarian Regimes in Inter-War Europe�, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions , Vol. 2, No. 2, 2002,pp.24-43.
 See especially M. Weber (eds G. Roth and C. Wittich), Economy and Society (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968).
 R. Eatwell, �Reflections on Fascism and Religion�, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions , Vol. 4, No. 3, 2003, pp.145-166.
 See R. Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
 Griffin takes the term from R.M. Platt: see Platt�s article in R. Griffin (ed.), International Fascism (London: Edward Arnold, 1998).
 On this see R. Mallett, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933-1940 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003).
 R. Eatwell, �Zur Natur des�generischen Faschismus� - das �faschistische Minimum� und die �faschistische Matrix�� in U. Backes (ed.), Rechsextreme Ideologien in Geschichte und Gegenwartt (Cologne: Bohlau Verlag, 2003).
 For the most recent statement of this argument see R.O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (London: Allen Lane, 2004).
 R. Eatwell, �Towards a New Model of the Rise of Right Wing Extremism�, German Politics , Vol. 6,No. 3, pp.166-184, 1997.
 A key theme in I. Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-1936: Hubris (London: Allen Lane, 1998).
 For an extreme version of this argument see Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Oxford: Polity, 1989).